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ant is not liable beyond the terms of any valid contract between
the company.and the sender under which the message was transmitted.
I think there is no error in the record, and the judgment and
order appealed from should be affirmed.
THORN'tON, J., also dissented.
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'ACCORD.

Payment of Part-Agreement to Accept from Third Person.-An
agreement by a creditor to accept a smaller sum in satisfaction of a debt,
carried into execution by receipt of the money and execution of a formal
and positive instrument of release, with all other acts essential to an
absolute relinquishment of his right, is a valid and irrevocable act:
Gordon v. Moore, 44 Ark.
An agreement by a creditor to accept from a third person, in behalf
of the debtor, money or a security for a smaller sum in satisfaction of
the whole, is valid and binding and will discharge the debt: 1d.
.AGENT.

See Mortgage.

AMENDMENT.

Declaration-Damages-ncreasing
ad damnum after Verdict.-There
is no error in allowing an amendment of a declaration by increasing the
ad damnum after verdict. Such an amendment relates to matter of
form, rather than substance: Tomlinson v. Earnshaw, 112 Ill.
ATTACHMENT.

Undisclosed PrincipaZ.-Property purchased by an agent in his own
name for an undisclosed principal, cannot be seized for the debt of the
agent unless his creditor has been misled by appearances or the conduct
of the parties into giving him credit upon a false basis: Reed v. c-llroy,
44 Ark.
From B. D. Turner, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 44 Ark. Rep.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 112 11. Rep.
3 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 42 or
43. Ohio St. Rep.
4 From Edwin L. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 57 Vt. Rep.
1
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BANKRUPTCY.

Debt Created by Fraud- Constructive Fraud.-The plaintiffs, as an
accommodation to themselves, gave an order to the defendant directing
their debtor to pay him what was due them. He collected and used the
money by mingling it with his own; and in a few days afterwards was
adjudged a bankrupt. After his discharge, in an action to recover the
money, the court below found that there was no evidence tending to
show actual fraud or fraudulent intent. The plaintiffs testified that
when the order was given they told him " to keep the money until they
called for it;" the defendant testified that they told him "to keep and
use the money until they called for it." The jury found that the plaintiffs were right as to the instruictioDs given: -Held, that the defendant's
duty was that of a bailee without hire ; that his use of the money was
a conversion of it and a fraudulent act; that the debt was "created by
fraud," within the meaning of the bankrupt act and not discharged:
.Hamnwnd v. Noble, 57 Vt.
BILLS AND NOTES.

See Surety.

COMMON CARRIER.

Coupon Tickets over several Lines-Liability of Comanies-Ejetion
of Passenger-Damages.-Throughtickets in the form of coupons, sold
to a passenger by one railroad company, entitling him to pass over successive connecting lines of road, in the absence of an express agreement create no contract with the company selling the same, to carry
him beyond the line of its own road, but they are distinct tickets for
each road, sold by the first company as agent for the others, so far as
the passenger is concerned: PennsylvaniaRailroadCo.v. Cannell, 112 Ill.
Where a coupon ticket has been sold calling for passage over several
distinct lines of railroad, the rights of the passenger, and the duty and
responsibility of the several companies over whose roads the passenger
is entitled to a passage, are the same as if he had purchased a ticket
at the office of each company constituting the through line: Id.
Where a conductor of a railway company, acting under instructions
from his superior, refuses to accept a ticket issued by another company
as agent of the former, and demands full fare, the passenger, if his
ticket was issued by authority, may pay the fare again and recover of
the company requiring payment the sum paid, as for a breach of contract, or he may refuse to pay, and leave the train when so ordered by
the conductor, and sue and recover of the company all damages sustained
in consequence of his expulsion from the train ; but if he refuses to
leave, he ca nnot recover for the force used by the conductor in putting
him off, when-no more force is used than necessary, and the expulsion
is not wanton or wilful: d.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Taxation.

CORPORATION.

.Fofeitureof Franchise--Inwhat Proceedingto be Determined-In.
junction- Ultra Fires-A cause of forfeiture of a franchise can not be
taken advantage of, or enforced against a corporation collaterally or incidentally, or in any other mode than by a direct proceeding for that purpose against the corporation: Attorney-General v. Chicago and Evanston
Railroad Co., 112 Ill.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Where a corporation has ceased to exist, and is absolutely dead in law,
a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin threatened acts by persons
assuming to act on behalf of, and in the name of the dead corporation : Jd.
And if a valid corporation assumes to exercise licenses or powers by
virtue of an invalid ordinance of a municipal corporation, or in excess
of authority legally conferred upon it, a court of equity, upon a proper
showing, has jurisdiction to interfere and restrain it: Id.
DAMAGES.

See Common Carrier.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

ConditionalSale-Lease-ssgnee.-Propertysold conditionally and
delivered, without a legal record of the lien, passes to the assignee of
the vendee under the insolvent law: Collender Co. v. .Marshall,57 Vt.
A contract by which a vendee of billiard tables agrees to pay in
monthly instalments in one year the entire value of the tables, and if
he so paid the property was to be his, and if not, the vendor's, is a conditional sale, and not a lease : Id.
When one here orders goods from a party in New York on certain
terms, as to payment, &c., but they are shipped, consigned to the vendor, and accepted on different terms: Held, that the contract was made
in this state: Id.
FRAUD. See Mortgage.
FRAUDS; STATUTE OF.

Sale -of L.and- When not within.-The plaintiff's house being mortgaged, he entered into a parol contract with the defendant to purchase
the mortgage, sell the house, and after satisfying the mortgage debt,
costs, &c., to pay the balance to the plaintiff. The defendant purchased
as agreed, foreclosed, and sold the house, the plaintiff in reliance on the
contract allowing the equity of redemption to expire : Reld, that the
plaintiff in assumpsit could recover the balance; that the contract was
not within the Statute of Frauds, in that it was not for the sale of lands
or an interest in or concerning them, and could be completely performed
within one year; that parol evidence was admissible to prove the con.
tract: .McGinnisv. Cook, 37 Vt.
-Promise of Executor in consideration of Agreement not to Dispute
WilL-The promise of an executor to pay $5000 to one of the testator's
heirs-at-law, who received nothing under the will, in consideration that
he would forbear further opposition to the probate of the will, claimed
to have been made as it was through undue influence, is not within the
statute; and such forbearance is a sufficient consideration : Bellows v.
Sowles, 57 Vt.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

See Infant.

Pledge of Ward's Property--Right of Ward as against Purcnaser.A former guardian of the plaintiff's ward pledged to the defendant bank
to secure his own note two negotiable bonds owned by the ward, on
which bonds was an endorsement tending to show the ward's ownership,
and which was seen by the cashier at the time of the negotiation.
Held, 1, that the defendant was not entitled to the protection of an
innocent purchaser; that it was put upon inquiry, and that it was not
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sufficient to only inquire of the guardian ; 2, that the plaintiff could
recover the bonds in an action of replevin ; 8, that the settlement of
the guardian's account in the Probate Court did not affect the title to
the bonds: Langdon v. Baxter Nat. Bank, 57 Vt.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Surety.
INFANT.

Negliqence of Chdld-Liability of Parent.-The relation of the defendants was that of father and son. The son was twenty-eight years
old, and, while living with his father as a hired man on his farm, took
his father's horse and drove three miles to the railroad depot to get one
of his own friends. The father did not know that the son took the
horse until after he was gone; but expected and was willing that he
should do so. The son had driven the team before without permission.
The horse, tied to a post in the rear of the depot, where the defendants
were accustomed to hitch, broke away, ran into the plaintiff's team and
injured him. The referee found that the son in tying the horse "did
not exercise the prudence of an average prudent man :" Held, that the
father was not liable, but that the son was; that license to use the horse
could not be inferred from the fact of former use without leave: Way
v. Powers, 57 Vt.
Duty of Court to protect-Failureof Guardian to interpose proper
Defeace.-An infant suitor or defendant, when brought into court, becomes the ward of the court, whose duty it is to see that his rights in
the subject-matter of the litigation are properly presented and protected.
If the general guardian fails to appear, the court should appoint a guardian ad litent to look after the infhnt's rights: Lloyd v. Eirkwood 112 .
Ill.
If the guardian who undertakes this trust, whether he be the general
guardian, or guardian ad litem, fitils to properly protect the interests of
the ward, it isthe duty of the court, sua s.ponte, to compel him to do so
whenever that fact comes to the knowledge of the court. The court
should see that the proper pleadings are made to present any defence
the infant may have: Id.
Where a bill to establish and enforce a resultinz trust as against an
infant heir, showed upon its face that the alleged trust arose twenty-five
years before suit, and the court rendering a decree therein against the
infant failed to require the guardian ad litem to set up the laches in
defence, it was held, that the proceedings and decree against the infant
showed error on their face, sufficient to justify the court in setting the
decree aside on bill filed by the infant: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Untenantable Premises.-The lessee of a room in a block covenanted
to keep the premises in good and constant repair. A building was thereafter erected on an adjoining vacant lot by the owner thereof, not the
lessor, whereby the demised premises were, to a great extent, cut off
from light and ventilation, and were also rendered damp and unhealthy,
but were capable of being made tenantable by repairs : R-ld, that the
lessee was not authorized to abandon the lease and refuse payment of
the accruing rent: Hilliard v. N. Y. & C. Gas Coal Co., 42 or 43
Ohio St.
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LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Cause accruing in other State.-The Statute of Limitation, R. L. s.
970, is not a defence, when the cause of action accrued in another state,
unless both parties resided there at the time the cause of action accrued;
thus, the plaintiff resided in Ohio and the defendants in Pennsylvania,
when the debt was contracted, the residence of neither party having
been changed: Held, that the statute was not a bar: Troll v. Hanauer,
57 Vt.
MANIDAMUS.

The right to a writ of mandamus to enforce the performance of an
official act by a public officer depends upon his legal duty and not upon
his doubts; and where his duty is clear, its performance will not be
excused by his doubts concerning it, however strong or honest they may
be: State v. Tnryen, 42 or 43 Ohio St.
MORTGAGE.

Fraud-Agency-BonaFRde Furchaser.-R..the owner, having sold
land and taken a mortgage thereon from the vendee to secure the payment of the purchase-money, afterwards executed a release of the mortgage and took a second mortgage on the premises from the vendee, for
the balance of the pucchase-money then unpaid. The release and second
mortgage were entrusted by R. to the vendee, to be by the latter entered
for record. The vendee caused the release to be duly recorded, but
failed to deliver the second mortgage for record. After the release was
recorded, the vendee made his notes and executed a mortgage on the
premises to L. to secure the same, without consideration thereibr, which
mortgage was immediately recorded, and on the 17th of January 1879,
the notes were endorsed and delivered, and the mortgage was assigned
by L. to J., a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without
notice. After the mortgage to L. had been recorded, the vendee returned the unrecorded mortgage to R., who filed it for record on the
21st of April 1879: Held, that the mortgage of J. was the first and
best lien on the premises: Ramsey v. Jones, 42 or 43 Ohio St.
NEGLIGENCE. See Infant.
Bridge Owners-Failure to prevent Accumulation of .Drifts.-It is
the duty of the owners of a bridge across a navigable stream to use reasonable diligence to prevent such accumulation of drift about the bridge
piers, either above or below the surface of the water, as might endanger
navigation ; and for failure to use such diligence they will be liable for
damages resulting from such obstruction to crafts navigating the river,
unless there was contributory negligence in the careless and unskilful
piloting of the craft; St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway
Co., v. eleese, 4- Ark.
Crossing Railroad Track- Omission to Stop, Look and Listen- Question for the Jury.-It is the duty of a person about to cross a railroad
track, to approach cautiously, and endeavor to ascertain if there is present danger in crossing; and when the railroad track and crossing are
so situated, that the approach of a train can not be seen, it may be the
duty of a person about to cross, to stop and look, to ascertain if a train
is coming: Pennsylvania Co. v. Franer,112 Ill.
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It is a question of fact for the jury to determine from the evidence,
whether a person receiving an injury from the alleged negligence of
another, and who sues to recover therefor, has exercised proper care and
caution on his part, and not one of law. It is not for the court to tell
the jury that certain facts constitute negligence, and an instruction so
telling the jury is erroneous : Id.
In an action against a railway company, the court was asked by the
defendant to instruct, that if the jury believed, from the evidence, that
the plaintiff If could have discovered the approach of defendant's train,
and avoided the injury in question by having stopped his mule before
driving upon the track, and looking and listening for the approach of
said train, then he can not recover in this ease, unless," &a.: H1eld,
properly refused, as it virtually took the question of fact (plaintiff's care
or negligence) from the jury: Id.
PARENT AND CHILD.

See Infant.

PARTITION.

NAot Maintainablefor Land adversely held.-A party claiming the
legal title to an undivided interest in land cannot maintain proceedings
for partition with his co-tenant, while his interest is held adversely by
others. He must first establish his title at law: Moore v. Gordon,
44 Ark.
PARTNERSHIP.

Test of-Participationin Profits.-The rule that participation in the
profits of a business, was the test of partnership as to liability to creditors, has been abandoned in England, and generally in America; and
now the test is whether the business has been carried on in behalf of the
person sought to be charged as a partner; i. e., did he stand in the relation of principal towards the ostensible traders by whom the liabilities
were incurred, and under whose management the profits have been made;
but as between the parties themselves, the test has always been their
actual intent; Culle3, v. Edwards, 44 Ark.
PLEADING.
RAILROAD.

See Amendment.

See Common Carrier; Negligence.
RECEIVER.

Application of Funds-Priorityof Mortgages.--The holder of a second mortgage in an action to foreclose, made all lien holders parties,
prior and subsequent, and moved for the appointment of a receiver to
collect rents and income of the mortgaged lands pending the action.
The appointment of a receiver was refused. Afterwards a junior mortgagee commenced an action to foreclose making all lien holders parties,
and upon hi motion a receiver was appointed: Held, that the fund collected by the receiver, was applicable to the liens on the property in the
order of their priority: Williamson v. Gerlach,42 or 43 Ohio St.
MORTGAGE.

See Receiver.

REPLEVIN.

For Goods Ttermi*xed. Replevin cannot be maintained for a mass of

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

cotton in which the plaintiff's has been innocently mixed by the defendant, nor for an undivided share of the mass. It must be first separated
and capable of identification: Hart v. Morton, 44 Ark.
SALE. See Debtorand Creditor.
STATUTE.

Construction of-When "may" means "shall."--The word "may,"
in a statute, means "shall " whenever the rights of the public or third
persons depend upon the exercise of the power, or the performance of
the duty to which it refers. The word has such meaning in the proviso
of section 90 of the practice act : James v. Dexter, 112 Ill.
SURETY.
Collateral NAote by Wife as Surety-Extension of Original.-Wise
needed money to pay judgments that were pressing him. Willard agreed
to endorse his note to S. for $2700, at four months, if Wise and wife
would make to him (Willard) their note for $3000, at four months,
secured by mortgage on the wife's land; he to hold and use said mortgage to protect himself against loss and expense because of said endorsement. Neither note was paid at maturity. The mortgage note was
never extended, but the other note was renewed by agreement of the
parties to it for a valuable consideration. It remained unpaid, and Willard sued Wise and wife on the mortgage note. She set up the extension of the $2700 note as a release of her property: Held, as Willard
made no .extension of the mortgage note he did not lose his right to
enforce the mortgage for his indemnity. The extensipn of the $2700
note did not affect the right of the wife to pay the $3000 note and
enforce reimbursement by her husband: Wise v. Willard, 42 or 43
Ohio St.
CollateralNote-Extension of Orignal.-Where the payee of a promissory note for $1500 held another note of the makers for $1000, given
as collateral to the first note, with sureties, and payable at a time to which
the payment of the principal note had been extended, and the payee
after the maturity of the collateral note again extended the time of
payment of the principal note for a definite time, by a valid agreement
and without the consent of the sureties on the collateral note, he thereby
discharged them: Slagle v. Pow, 42 or 43 Ohio St.
TAXATION.

Corporation-Shares of Non-Resident-Stoccholders.-Under our
statute the stock of non-resident stockholders of a corporation located
in this state may be legally set in the list of the town in which the corporation has its principal place of business; and the corporation compelled by mandamus to pay the taxes assessed upon such stock: Town
of St. Albans v. Nat. Car Co., 57 Vt.
A statute authorizing such taxation, and allowing the corporation to
deduct the taxes thus paid from the dividends due to such stockholders,
is constitutional: Id.
When a charter is taken subject to future legislation, it may be modified not only by special amendments, but also by a general law: Id.

